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Abstract 
By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an investment 
decision in a competitive market can be seen as a “game” between firms, as firms implicitly take 
into account other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions. We review two decades of real 
option game models, suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” by considering game 
theory, and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed. We provide some 
insights on the plausible empirical applications, or shortfalls in applications to date, and suggest 
some promising avenues for future research.  
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1. Introduction 
Investment in competitive markets is a “game” among firms, since in making investment decisions, 
firms implicitly take into account what they think will be the other firms’ reactions to their own 
investment actions, and realize that their competitors think the same way. Consequently, as game 
theory aims to provide an abstract framework for modeling situations involving interdependent 
choices, and “real options” (“RO”) theory is appropriate for most investment decisions, a 
combination of these two theories have yielded promising results.  
A “standard real option game” (“SROG”) model is where the value of the investment is treated as a 
state variable that follows a known process
3
; time is considered infinite and continuous; the 
investment cost is sunk, indivisible and known
4
; firms are not financially constrained; the 
investment problem is studied in isolation as if it is the only asset on the firm’s balance sheet (i.e., 
the game is played on a single project); and there are usually two firms holding the option to invest
5
. 
The focus is the derivation of the firms’ value functions and their respective investment thresholds, 
under the assumption that either firms are risk-neutral or the stochastic evolution of the variable(s) 
underlying the investment value is spanned by the current instantaneous returns from a portfolio of 
securities that can be traded continuously without transaction costs in a perfectly competitive capital 
market.  
The two most common investment games are the “pre-emption game” (PE) and the “war-of-
attrition game” (WOA), both usually formulated as “zero-sum games” (i.e., firms can only improve 
their profits by reducing the profits of rivals). In the PE, it is assumed that there is a “first-mover 
advantage” (“FMA”) that gives firms an incentive to be the first to invest.  In the attrition game, it is 
assumed that there is a second-mover advantage that gives firms an incentive to be the second to 
invest. Typically the advantage of investing first/second is assumed to be limited
6
, so the investment 
of the leader (PE) or the follower (WOA) does not completely eliminate the revenues of its rival.  
The investment game is treated as a “one-shot” game (i.e., firms are allowed to invest only once); 
firms invest either sequentially or simultaneously, or both; cooperation between firms is not 
allowed; the market for the project, underlying the investment decision, is considered to be 
complete and frictionless; and firms are assumed to be ex-ante (i.e., before the investment) and ex-
post (i.e., after the investment) symmetric. 
                                                                
3 Typically, geometric Brownian motion (gBm) and mean reverting processes, stochastic processes with jumps, birth and 
death processes, or combinations of these processes. 
4 Some authors relax this assumption, such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter 6, and Azevedo and Paxson (2011) where 
the investment cost follows a gBm process. 
5 See Bouis et al. (2009) for an example of a RO model with three firms. 
6 Exceptions to this rule are Williams (1993) and Murto and Keppo (2002) models, derived for a context of complete pre-
emption. 
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In models where the RO value is driven by just one stochastic underlying variable, the firm’s 
optimal investment timing is defined by a point; in models that use two stochastic underlying 
variables, by a line; and in models that use three or more stochastic underlying variables, by a 
surface or other more complex space structures. However, regardless of the number of underlying 
variables used, the principle remains the same: “a firm should invest as soon as its investment 
threshold is crossed the first time”. “Non-standard real options games” (“NSROG”) relax some of 
these assumptions and constraints
7
.  
The three most basic elements that characterize a game are the players, their strategies and payoffs. 
Translating these to a “real option game” (“ROG”), the players are the firms that hold the option to 
invest, the strategies are the choices “invest”/”defer” and the payoffs are the firms’ value functions. 
Additionally, to be fully characterized, a game still needs to be specified in terms of what sort of 
information (complete/incomplete, perfect/imperfect, symmetric/asymmetric) the players have at 
each instant. Also required are what type of game is being played (a “one-shot” game, a “zero-sum” 
game, a sequential/simultaneous game, or a cooperative/non-cooperative game); and whether mixed 
strategies are allowed. 
One difference between a “standard game” (“SG”) from game theory and a SROG is in the way the 
players’ payoffs are given. In SG  such as the “prisoners’ dilemma”, the “grab-the-dollar”, the 
“burning the bridge” or the “battle-of-the-sexes”, the players’ payoffs are usually deterministic,  
while in SROG they are given by sometimes complex mathematical functions that depend on one, 
or more, stochastic underlying variables
8
. This fact changes radically the rules under which the 
game equilibrium is determined, because if the players’ payoffs depend on time, and time is 
continuous, the game is played in continuous-time. But, if the game is played in a continuous-time 
and players can move at any time, what does the strategy “move immediately after” mean? In the 
RO literature, the approach used to overcome this problem is usually based on Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985) – F&T (1985) - who develop a new formalism for modeling deterministic timing 
games and introduce the “principle of rent equalization” for pre-emption games, a methodology 
which was extended to stochastic ROG
9
.     
The main principle underlying game theory is that those involved in strategic decisions are affected 
not only by their own choices but also by the decisions of others. Once the structure of a game and 
                                                                
7 Models that use more than one stochastic underlying variable are defined here as NSROG. 
8 In SROG the game “payoffs” are denoted “value functions”. 
9 Sometimes without a proper consideration of its appropriateness, as highlighted by Thijssen et al. (2012) –see discussion 
in section 2.2.  
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the strategies of the players are set, the equilibrium of the game can be determined using Nash 
(1950, 1953)
 10
.  
We cite an extensive number of papers, published or in progress, modeling investment decisions 
considering uncertainty and competition. Our goal is to organize two decades of literature on ROG 
models into “game-theoretic categories”, a unique contribution in the literature, giving particular 
emphasis to the models underlying game-theoretic aspects in terms of what has been accomplished, 
relating the accomplished results to the known empirical evidence and industry applications, if 
any
11
. There is a consensus among researchers that it might be possible to develop more 
sophisticated ROG through a better integration between real options and game theory. We suggest 
new avenues for future research, partly based on perceived (game-theoretic related) gaps in the 
literature
12
.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce basic aspects of the SROG models, 
discuss the mathematical formulation, principles and methodologies commonly used to derive the 
firms’ value functions (payoffs) and investment thresholds, and introduce and contrast the discrete-
time and the continuous-time frameworks when applied to ROG. Section 3 reviews two decades of 
academic research on “standard” and “non standard” ROG. Section 4 surveys the limited empirical 
research and suggests some testable hypotheses.  Section 5 concludes and suggests new avenues for 
research.  
2. SROG Framework 
Consider an industry comprised of two (ex-ante/ex-post) identical firms, possessing an option to 
invest in the same (and unique) project that will produce a unit of output. The irreversible 
investment cost is I and the cash flow stream from the investment is uncertain. The payoff of each 
firm is affected by the actions (strategy) of its rival
13
. The price unit of output, ( )P t  fluctuates 
stochastically over time according to equation (1), 
 ( ) ( ) ( )P t X t D Q t                               (1) 
                                                                
10 When competing for the revenues from an investment, if firms reach a point where there is a set of strategies with the 
property that no firm can benefit by changing its strategy while its opponent keeps its strategies unchanged, then that set 
of strategies, and the corresponding firms’ payoffs, constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
11 Huisman et al. (2004) and Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis (2011) are also literature reviews of RO models. While 
we focus mainly on the game theoretic aspects underlying RO models and provide full game-theoretic classification for 
the selected articles, Huisman et al. (2004) focus mainly on continuous-time lumpy problems, and Chevalier-Roignant and 
Trigeorgis (2011) are more centered on other modeling aspects of RO models such as myopic investment behavior, 
incremental capacity expansion and demand shocks. 
12 We provide in the Appendix full game-theoretic characterization for each article reviewed. 
13 In the extreme case, as soon as one firm invests, the investment becomes worthless for the other firm. 
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where,  ( )D Q t  is the inverse demand function, with ( )Q t  representing the industry supply process.  
The market supply has three states, ( ) 0Q t  , ( ) 1Q t   and ( ) 2Q t  , for the scenarios where both firms 
are idle, only the leader is active and both firms are active, respectively.  The inverse demand 
function is downward sloping (  ' ( ) 0D Q t  ), which ensures a FMA; and ( )X t  is an exogenous shock 
process to demand following a gBm process given by Equation (2). 
X X
dX Xdt Xdz                 (2) 
where, X  is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in X  per unit of time; X  
is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit of time; and dz is the increment of a 
standard Wiener process for the variable X .  
At the beginning of the investment game each firm contemplates two choices, whether it should be 
the first to exercise the option (becoming the leader) or the second to exercise (entering the market 
as a follower), having for each of these strategies an optimal time to act. The equilibrium set of 
exercise strategies is derived by letting the firms choose their roles and deriving the value functions 
of both firms, starting with the follower’s value function and then working backwards in a dynamic 
programming fashion to determine the leader’s value function.  
Denoting ( )FF X  as the value of the follower before investing and assuming that firms are risk-
neutral, ( )FF X must solve the following equilibrium differential equation:  
2
2 2
2
( ) ( )1
( ) 0
2
F F
X X F
F X F X
X X rF X
X X
 
   
 
                                   (3) 
The differential equation (3) must be solved subject to the boundary conditions (4) and (5), which 
ensure that the follower invests at a moment where its “option to invest” is maximized: 
*
* (2)( ) FF F
x
X D
F X I
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 

                                            (4) 
' * (2)( )F F
x
D
F X
r


                                                        (5) 
where, *
F
X  is the value of ( )X t  that triggers entry. For convergence of the solution we assume that 
( ) 0
x X
r    , where r is the riskless interest rate, and both the leader and follower have the same I .  
The follower should invest the first time *( )
F
X t X . The boundary condition (4) is the value-matching 
condition. It states that at the moment the follower’s option is exercised its net payoff is 
* (2) / ( )F XX D r I   (the discounted expected present value of the follower’s share of the duopoly 
cash flow in perpetuity). The boundary condition (5) is called the “smooth-pasting” or “high-
contact” condition, and ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen to maximize the value of the 
option. Through this procedure we get closed-form solutions for the leader’s and the follower’s 
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value functions, ( )FF X  and ( )LF X , respectively equations (8) and (6), and for the follower’s 
investment threshold, *
F
X , equation (7)  
*
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*
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where (2) (1)D D  and 
1  is the positive root of the following quadratic function: 
   20.5 1 0r r       ,  given by equation (9): 
2
1(2) 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 2
 
2 2
r r r  
      
   
                           (9) 
Using the “principle of rent equalization” of F&T (1985), we derive the leader’s investment 
threshold, *LX , equalizing, for 
*
F
X X , expressions (6) and (8), and replacing in the resulting equation 
X  by *LX  
and solving for *LX . Figure 1 illustrates the value functions of both firms and respective 
investment thresholds as a function of X . 
  
 Fig. 1 – Value Functions of the Leader and the Follower for a Two-Firm Pre-emption Game 
 
If both firms want to be the leader and invest at the same time, they will invest at the point where 
rents equalize, *LX X , (the pre-emption trigger) where the value function of both firms cross the first 
time
14
. Thereafter, they enjoy the duopoly cash flow in perpetuity, given by equation (10). 
                                                                
14 There are ROG models for duopolies, such as Murto and Keppo (2002), where simultaneous investment is not allowed. 
In such cases, it is assumed that “if the two firms want to invest simultaneously, then the one with the highest value, X , 
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 D(2)
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                                (10) 
Following the approach above, sometimes with small adjustments in the underlying variable(s) 
and/or the competition setting, following Smets (1993)
15
, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch. 9), Huisman 
(2001), Paxson and Pinto (2005), and Pawlina and Kort (2006), among others, developed ROG 
models for leader-follower competition settings. With few exceptions, it is assumed that firms can 
observe all the parameters of the model (drift, volatility, etc) and the evolution of the random 
variable dz given in equation (2). 
2.1 The pre-emption game 
The pre-emption game is one of the most common games in the ROG literature, usually formulated 
as a two-player game where time is continuous and the horizon of the game is infinite. RO theory 
shows that when an investor has a monopoly over an investment decision, with the investment cost 
irreversible and the expected revenues from the investment uncertain, there is an option value to 
wait which is an incentive to delay the investment more than the “net present value” (“NPV”) 
methodology suggests. The more uncertain are the revenues, the more valuable is the option to 
defer the investment. However, when competition is added to the investment problem, ceteris 
paribus, the intuition is that the value of the option to wait tends to erode. The higher the 
competition between firms, the less valuable is the option to defer the investment.  
In RO duopoly pre-emption games we use the F&T (1985) principle of rent equalization, which 
advocates that the erosion in the value of the option to defer the investment is caused by the fact 
that each firm fears being pre-empted in the market by its rival due to the FMA. They use a two-
firm deterministic game setting to optimize the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effect 
of pre-emption in games of timing, and show that the threat of pre-emption equalizes rents.  
Figure 1 above illustrates how this principle works, where we can identify three different regions on 
the ( )X t  line: *0, LX , 
* *,L FX X  and 
* ,FX  . In the interval 
*0, LX  the payoff of the follower is higher 
than that of the leader, for * *,L FX X  the payoff of the leader is higher than that of the follower; for 
* ,FX   both firms have the same payoff. In addition, we can see that A is the point where the 
leader’s advantage reaches a maximum. In absence of the pre-emption effect, the optimal time to 
invest for the leader is at point A. However, when there is a FMA, firms are afraid of being pre-
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
gets the project; if the project has the same value for both firms and both want to invest at the same time, the one who gets 
the project is chosen randomly using an even uniform distribution.” 
15 The first RO model considering competition was developed by Frank Smets in his PhD dissertation (1993), chapter 1, 
pp. 36-66, applied to a duopoly foreign direct investment decision. 
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empted and so the leader invests at point *
L
X , where the payoffs (rents) from being the leader and 
the follower equalize.  
Notice that, in the interval  * ,LX A  there are an infinite number of timing strategies that would lead to 
a better payoff for the leader than the strategy to invest at *
L
X . However, when the two firms have 
perfect, complete and symmetric information about the game, both know that in the interval  * ,LX A  
if they invest an instant before the opponent they will get a payoff advantage, and this competition 
to pre-empt the rival leads both firms to target their investment at point *
L
X , where each firm has a 
50 percent chance of being the leader. As soon as one firm achieves the leadership in the 
investment, for the follower, the optimal time to invest is point *
F
X . After the follower investment 
both firms share the market revenues in a (deterministic) pre-assigned way.   
In Figure 1 the value functions of the leader and the follower overlap each other for * ,FX  , i.e., 
after the follower invests, both firms share a (permanent) symmetric market share where the initial 
FMA is completely eliminated. However, the framework above allows other deterministic ex-post 
market share arrangements where a certain (temporary or permanent) FMA is kept. In this later 
case, the leader’s value function would be parallel to and above the follower’s value function 
for * ,FX  .    
2.2 Continuous-time vs discrete-time games 
SROG are usually formulated in continuous-time
16
 and focused on symmetric and Markov 
equilibrium exercise strategies in which each firm’s exercise strategy, conditional upon the other’s 
exercise strategy, is value-maximizing. It is a Markov equilibrium in the sense that it is considered 
that the state of the decision process tomorrow is only affected by the state of the decision process 
today, and not by the other states before that.  
In continuous-time games with an infinite horizon, the time index t, is defined in the domain 
 0,t 
17
.  Given the strategies available and the relative values of the leader and the follower for a 
given current value ( )X t , an equilibrium set of exercise strategies for each firm can be constructed. 
However, in sequential continuous-time ROG there is no definition for “the last period” and the 
“next period”. This introduces potential time-consistency problems since it restricts the set of 
                                                                
16 Some exceptions are Smit and Ankum (1993), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Smit (2003), Murto et al. (2004) and Smit 
and Trigeorgis (2004, chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7), who use discrete-time frameworks. 
17 Notice that in ROG the focus of the analysis is directed not to the “timing strategy”, chronologically speaking, but to the 
time at which the value of the investment reaches a threshold, regardless of at which chronological point in time that 
occurs. For mathematical convenience time is assumed to be infinite, although this assumption is not realistic for most 
investment projects. 
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possible strategic game equilibria
18
. To overcome this problem, the F&T (1985) results for 
deterministic game settings have been applied to continuous-time (pre-emption) ROG, sometimes, 
as highlighted by Thijssen et al. (2012), without a proper consideration of their appropriateness. 
Thijssen et al. (2012) show that it is often incorrect to exclude the scenario where both firms invest 
at the same time, and provide a more realistic ROG framework where the risk underlying strategic 
investment decisions is explicitly taken into account by the firms.  
The formulation of firms’ investment strategies in continuous-time is complex. Grenadier (2000, 
pp. xxi-xxvi) provides a heuristic version of the equilibrium exercise strategies for a duopoly ROG.  
3. ROG models 
The SROG branch of literature uses game theory concepts/assumptions that fit with those described 
in the introduction and an analytical formulation similar to that described in section 2. Its main 
contribution is the results and empirical support provided, or practical applications or the 
assumptions regarding the evolution process of the (mono) stochastic variable that drives the value 
of the investment, rather than the novelty of the game theory concepts or mathematical formulation 
used in the ROG model. NSROG uses game theory concepts or analytical formulations which 
diverge from those used in SROG, addressing critical issues as: (1) the degree of competition, or 
games with more than two firms, or the existence of exit-option(s), (2) asymmetries between firms, 
(3) games of asymmetric, or incomplete, or imperfect information, (4) cooperative games, (5) 
games where market sharing is dynamic, or (6) consideration of other factors not found in SROG.   
3.1 SROG models 
The literature combining the RO valuation technique with game theory concepts started with Smets 
(1993), who develops a RO model considering the trade-off between the option value of delaying a 
“foreign direct investment” (“FDI”) and the value of investing first in a ex-ante symmetric 
duopolistic FDI market. Following Smets (1993), Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch. 9) develop a basic 
ROG model for symmetric duopoly markets with a FMA.    
Grenadier (1996) develops an equilibrium game framework for strategic RO exercise games for a 
symmetric duopoly market, suggesting a possible explanation for why some markets may 
experience building booms in the face of declining demand and property values. Huisman (2001) 
provides several innovative new technology adoptions leader-follower game models, adding to the 
                                                                
18 For instance, the follower’s strategy “invest immediately after the leader” cannot be accommodated. A rich literature on 
continuous-time games of timing, discussing this and other conceptual problems can be found in Kreps and Wilson 
(1982a,b), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b), Simon and Stinchcombe (1989),  Stinchcombe (1992), Bergin (1992), Bergin 
and McLeod (1993), Stenbacka and Tombak (1994), Dutta and Rustichini (1995), and Laraki et al. (2005). 
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literature, among other contributions, the effect of technological uncertainty on firms investment 
behavior
19.
  
For a discrete-time framework, Smit and Ankum (1993) combine the RO approach of investment 
timing with basic principles of game theory and industrial organization, using standard game 
assumptions/formulation to illustrate the influence of competition on the project value and the 
investment timing. Smit (2003) focuses on the optional and strategic features of infrastructure 
investments to investigate his intuition that infrastructure investments generate other investment 
opportunities and, in doing so, change the strategic position of the firm. 
These models provided the game theoretic/RO framework foundations to developing new NSROG 
models.   
3.2 NSROG models 
The discussion below focuses mainly on only critical game-theoretic or analytical formulation parts 
of each article, ignoring other possibly important aspects. We classify the RO models according to 
their relevant underlying game-theoretic aspects. Some articles provide clear contributions 
regarding more than one game-theoretic aspect and are, therefore, reviewed as belonging to more 
than one developing ROG models group. In the Appendix we provide the full characterization for 
each model.   
3.2.1 Degree of competition     
SROG assume that there is a simple duopoly and the leadership is exogenously determined or 
randomly chosen. This is characteristic of only a few industries.  
i) n>2 rivals
20,21 
A natural development of ROG models, departing from Smets (1993), is the extension to markets 
with more than two firms. However, this imposes some challenges not only in the derivation of the 
firms’ investment thresholds but also on the characterization of the entry-sequence/simultaneous 
equilibrium.  
                                                                
19 Descriptions of SROG formulations can be found in Grenadier (2000a) who provides a summary of existing literature 
on game-theoretic option models, Grenadier (2000b) who illustrates how intersection of real options and game theory 
provides powerful insights into the behavior of economic agents under uncertainty, giving examples from real estate 
development in an oligopoly and oil exploration investment decisions with symmetric information. Smit and Trigeorgis 
(2004) provide several illustrations of model applications. 
20 In our classification “ 2n  ” is the ex-ante number of firms that are allowed to compete for the market revenues, not the 
number of firms that are allowed to invest. For instance, in complete preemption two-firm games there is no optimal 
investment time for the firm that is preempted –its payoff is nil. But the existence of the preempted firm affects the 
investment behavior of the firm that invests first. 
21 Other models such as those of Aguerrevere (2003, 2009), Grenadier (1999),  Lambrecht (1999, 2001), Lambrecht and 
Perraudin (2003), Murto and Keppo (2002), Nielson (2002), Thissen (2004) and Anderson et al. (2010) also study ROG 
with more than two firms (see the Appendix). However, due to their other more relevant characteristics they are reviewed 
in other sections. 
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Investments with more than two firms have been studied by Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier 
(2002) relying on the Leahy (1993) simplified myopic framework
22
. These papers are limited, 
however, to incremental investments given that the resolution of the equilibrium through the 
myopic strategy requires the assumption of infinitely divisible investment. Dynamic oligopoly 
markets with multiple lumpy investments have been studied by Gilbert and Harris (1984), 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Mills (1988), but for deterministic game settings with perfect 
foresight by the firms.     
In the ROG literature there are two main approaches which consider more than two firms. One, 
followed, for instance, by Williams (1993) for the real estate market, is to assume that ex-ante there 
are n  symmetric firms,  1,...,n  , whose value depends on exogenous state variables and in 
equilibrium all firms invest at the same time as soon as a given threshold is reached. Another, 
followed by Bouis et al. (2009), is to assume that ex-ante there are more than two firms (three in 
this case) whose value depends on exogenous state variables but firms enter the market 
sequentially, providing analytical (or quasi-analytical) solutions for the investment thresholds of 
each firm. This latter approach seems more realistic, particularly for large oligopolies where the 
coordination for simultaneous investment is hardly feasible, but analytically very challenging as the 
number of firms grows. 
Reiss (1998) and Armada et al. (2009)  use frameworks that are slightly different from the two 
above. The former is a complete preemption ROG model that optimizes when identical firms should 
patent/adopt an innovation, where the arrival time of competitors is modeled as a Poisson process.  
The number of firms is not specified, but instead there is a constant hazard rate dt  which is 
regarded as a measure of the rivalry intensity. Armada et al. (2009) assume only two firms are 
allowed to invest, in a leader-follower setting, but the investment behavior of these firms is affected 
by an unspecified number of “hidden rivals” whose mean of probability of arrival is represented by 
a parameter  , with 0,1 .       
More specifically, Williams (1993) considers n  symmetric firms,  1,...,n  , in a real estate market 
where the aggregate demand q  and the supply by each developed asset are proportional to power 
functions of the current asset income y : ( / )q x y  , with   constant. The income y , with 
1/y xq  , is related to an exogenous stochastic (gBm) variable x  which affects demand. He 
provides the first rigorous derivation of a non-preemption Nash-equilibrium and an analytical 
solution for the optimal building rate where each firm i (developer) conjectures correctly that each 
                                                                
22 Leahy (1993) studied investment under uncertainty for perfect competition settings, demonstrating that a competitive 
firm invests at the threshold of a myopic firm. 
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other firm currently builds at his optimal building rate *
m
b , with 1,..., 1, 1,...m i i n   . Since the 
building rate *b  can depend on the state variables q  and x , so each firm n correctly anticipates in 
equilibrium that all other firms currently build at the aggregate rate: * *
i mm i
b b  . Grenadier (2002) 
provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium for n symmetric firms, with  1,...,n  . He assumes that the market inverse demand 
function is of a constant-elasticity form: 1/( ) ( ). ( )P t X t Q t  , where 1/ ,n n   , to ensure that marginal 
profits are increasing in X, with  1,...,n  ,  and ( )X t  is a multiplicative demand shock that evolves 
according to a gBm process. Firms produce a single, homogeneous and infinitely divisible output 
and can continuously invest in additional capacity to increase output by infinitesimal increments. 
Among other relevant contributions Grenadier examines the impact of competition on the 
investment option value and provides an explicit expression for the option premium (OP), expressed 
as a function of the number of competitors (n): ( ) 1/ ( 1)OP n n  . He shows (through  numerical 
simulations) that competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to 
investment at very near the zero NPV threshold. Considering 1.5  , for perfect competition 
( n ), the ( ) 0OP   , for monopolies ( 1n  ), the (1) 2OP   (i.e., the equilibrium occurs when the 
NPV is equal to 200% of the investment cost), for duopolies ( 2n  ), the (2) 0.5OP   (i.e., the 
equilibrium occurs when the NPV is 50% of the investment cost).    
Bouis et al. (2009) find that in a market with three firms the investment timing of the first investor 
lies between the one and the two-firm case. More generally, they show that in equilibria where 
firms invest sequentially, the timing of the first investor in case of n+2 firms always lies between 
the timing of the n and n+1 firm case. They conclude that increased competition can delay rather 
than hasten investment and that market entry occurs earlier when the number of anticipated market 
entrants is small. Following the Bouis et al. (2009) approach, Pereira and Rodrigues (2010) consider 
a non-zero sum game for markets with three firms but where the entry of the third firm (called 
second follower) expands the total market.  
Murto et al. (2004) study a discrete-time state-space oligopoly game for homogeneous non-storable 
commodity markets, where the demand evolves stochastically and firms can make multiple lumpy 
investments in order to adjust their production cost functions or production capacities. They 
compare the case where firms invest identical lump sums with the case where one firm makes 
investments in larger lumps than the other firms, providing an illustration for the trade-off between 
flexibility and scale economies (in the sense that the firm with small investments is more flexible 
and the firm with larger investments is more cost-effective). In contrast to Williams (1993) and 
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Grenadier (2002), firms are required to invest sequentially to ensure a Markov-perfect Nash 
equilibrium. Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis (2010) also study lump investment decisions for 
oligopoly markets but in a continuous-time framework, where firms identify an opportunity to enter 
the market before it grows up to the point which justifies the entry cost. They show that in oligopoly 
markets, market entry involving lumpy investments takes place in sequence regardless of whether 
firms can observe their rivals’ moves.  
Odening et al. (2007) study investment decisions for perfect competition and demonstrate, using 
simulations, that myopic planning may lead to non-optimal investment strategies. Aguerrevere 
(2003) investigates the effect of competition on the dynamics of the price of a non-storable 
commodity considering incremental investment with time to build and operational flexibility. He 
shows that the effect of competition on properties of the endogenous output price is dramatic. 
Aguerrevere’s framework differs from that used by Grenadier (2002) because it does not allow for 
flexibility in the use of the installed capacity and the resulting output price is the same regardless of 
the number of competitors. Aguerrevere (2009) examines how competition in the product market 
affects the relation between firms’ investment decisions and their asset return dynamics, 
demonstrating that, when demand is low, firms in more competitive industries earn higher returns 
and, when demand is high, firms in more concentrated industries earn higher returns.  
ii) Exit options  
“Exit options” (“EO”) are considered in a continuous-time framework for monopolies under 
uncertainty, by Dixit (1989), Alvarez (1998, 1999) and SØdal (2006), among others, and, in a 
determinist framework for duopolies, by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1986).  However, with very few exceptions, EO have been neglected in ROG. It is usually assumed 
that firms optimally enter the market when a given RO threshold is reached and operate afterwards 
forever. This is rarely the case in real-life where (permanent or temporary) “exit” is possible. 
Methodologically, the “exit option-real option games” literature is closely related to some literature 
on “stopping time games”.  
With the exceptions of Lambrecht (2001), Murto (2004), Ruiz-Aliseda (2013) and Goto et al. 
(2008), ROG models study entry and exit strategies in isolation, that is  firms’ entry/exit behavior 
does not consider the interaction between the two options. Lambrecht (2001) investigates the 
interaction between market entry, company foreclosure and capital structure in a duopoly, where 
firms are restricted to a single entry/exit trigger strategy (one-shot entry/exit game), and provides 
explicit entry and exit thresholds. He extends the standard exit model by allowing financially 
distressed firms to renegotiate their debt contracts through a one-off debt exchange offer. The 
 14 
model allows us to analyse the order in which firms go bankrupt within a given industry, and 
concludes that firms with high bankruptcy costs or with prospects of profit improvement can obtain 
larger negotiated reductions on their debt repayments.  
Murto (2004) examines a declining duopoly market where firms consider exit, the profitability 
evolves according a gBm process, the decision to exit is irreversible and firms affect negatively 
each other so that both would benefit from the exit of the rival. In order to be active firms spend 
i
I  
units of money per unit of time with  1,2i  denoting the two firms. The profit flows for the 
monopoly and duopoly are given by ( )M M
i i i i i
X I XM I       and ( )D D
i i i i i
X I XD I     , respectively, 
with M and D denoting constants subjected to 0 i iD M  , respectively for the “monopoly” and the 
“duopoly”. The exit threshold for a duopoly is 
2 2
[ ( )] / [ ( 1)]( / )D
i i i i
X r D I r U      , where 
2
  is 
given by Eq. (9) and 
i
U  is the cost of permanent exit for firm i. Murto finds that with a low degree 
of uncertainty there is a unique equilibrium where one of the firms always exits before the other, 
and, when uncertainty is increased, there may be another equilibrium with the order reversed, 
depending on the degree of asymmetry in the firm specific parameters.  
Ruiz-Aliseda (2013) develops a “one-shot” entry/exit timing game model for a duopoly where firms 
have to decide at each instant whether to be in (if inactive) or out (if active) of a market that 
expands up to a random date and dies thereafter. He uses a timing game framework where firms are 
ex-ante asymmetric (i.e., investments are not equally recoverable). Among other relevant results, he 
finds that the destructive effect of the threat of pre-emption on option values is weak (or even 
totally eliminated) if the rival’s commitment to remain active in the market after investing is not 
credible. Goto et al. (2008) provide a feasible exit for a follower when profitability or the market 
declines.  
3.2.2 Asymmetries between firms 
Most ROG assume that firms are ex-ante/ex-post symmetric, following Smets (1993). Smets’ 
deterministic competition framework can, however, be easily adjusted to accommodate ex-post 
asymmetries between firms. There are several sources of RO value-related asymmetries between 
firms, such as different learning rates, organizational flexibility, liquidity constrains or 
benefits/losses from positive/negative externalities due to other firms investments, or different 
sunk/operating costs or combinations of several of these asymmetries
23
. Asymmetries between 
                                                                
23 We define “asymmetric ROG” as a game where firms are ex-ante or ex-post asymmetric regarding any RO value-
related variable, regardless of the type of game information structure (symmetric/asymmetric, complete/incomplete, 
perfect/imperfect) each firm faces.   
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firms can exist ex-ante only (i.e., before investment), ex-post only (i.e., after investment), or ex-ante 
and ex-post, and can be temporary or permanent, with the same or a different size and nature, and 
modeled as an endogenous or a deterministic variable. We focus mainly on the asymmetries 
regarding the RO parameters and the formulation used to incorporate them into the ROG models. 
Huisman (2001, ch. 8), develops a RO model for duopolies where firms face asymmetric costs in 
the adoption of a technology, and concludes that different equilibriums arise depending on the size 
of the cost asymmetry.  Following a similar framework as that of Huisman (2001, ch. 8), but for a 
scenario where firms are ex-ante active, Pawlina and Kort (2006) study the impact of asymmetric 
investment costs on the optimal RO exercise strategies for a duopoly. The instantaneous profits of 
firm i, with  1,2i , are represented by ( )
i j i jN N N N
x xD  , where x  follows a gBm process, 
i jN N
D  is a 
deterministic contribution to the profit function subjected to 
10 00
D D , 
10 11
D D , 
00 01
D D  and 
11 01
D D , which bound the competition conditions, 
k
N  equal to “0” or “1” if firm k has not invested 
or firm k has invested, respectively, with  ,k i j .  The cost asymmetry is introduced through 
2 1
I kI  with (1, )k   and 
1
I  and 
2
I  accounting for the investment cost of firms 1 and 2, respectively. 
They derive closed-form solutions for the leader and the follower for sequential investments, 
respectively 
1 1 1 11 01
/ ( 1)[ ( )] / ( )F
i
x I r D D       and 
1 1 1 1 10 01
/ ( 1)[ ( )] / ( )Lx I r D D      ,  and a threshold 
for simultaneous investment, 
1 1 11 00
/ ( 1)[ ( )] / ( )S
i i
x I r D D      .  They demonstrate that there are 
three equilibrium strategies and critical levels of cost asymmetry which delineate the equilibrium 
regions as a function of the market variables. Armada et al. (2009) uses the same framework to 
consider a leader-follower investment cost asymmetry. 
Kong and Kwok (2007) study for a duopoly the simultaneous effect of investment costs and 
revenue flow asymmetries. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004, ch. 7) analyse a duopoly two-stage game 
where firms choose output levels endogenously with possible asymmetric production costs. Carlson 
et al. (2012) study the simultaneous effect of asymmetric investment costs and salvage values. The 
incorporation of multiple ex-ante asymmetries between firms, although analytically challenging, 
provides a richer set of equilibrium strategies. Baba (2001) compares, for a duopolistic loan market, 
the firms’ behavior when the leadership role is interchangeable (ex-ante symmetry) with when the 
leadership is deterministically assigned (ex-ante asymmetry), and concludes that, in the latter case, 
banks have a greater incentive to wait until the loan demand conditions improve sufficiently.  
 
 
3.2.3 Information structure (asymmetric/incomplete/imperfect)
 
 
 16 
The assumption of symmetric, complete and perfect information is not realistic for most 
competitive investments since often firms’ conjectures about rival behavior are incorrect. ROG with 
asymmetric, or incomplete, or imperfect information, relax the assumption that all firms are 
identically and fully informed about the current value and the future evolution pattern of the ROG-
related variables and the rival’s reactions to their own actions. They specify, for each firm, the 
information structure under which it competes with the rivals. If a given game information structure 
is characteristic of one or few participants, the ROG is defined as an “asymmetric-incomplete (and 
possibly imperfect) information game”.  If it is equally shared by all the participants, it is defined as 
a “symmetric-complete-perfect information game” 24.  
Grenadier (1999) relaxes the RO standard assumption that timing the option exercise is 
simultaneous and uninformative and that agents are perfectly informed about the parameters of their 
opponents RO. He assumes that n-firms,  2,n  , are imperfectly and asymmetrically informed 
and may impute the private information of others by observing their exercise (or lack of exercise) 
decisions. His results for the option exercise policies equilibrium provide insights into the patterns 
of exercise. 
Following Grenadier (1999), but using a different payoff structure, Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) 
develop a 2-firm model where firm i can invest at cost 
i
I  in an income stream ( )x t  whose evolutions 
follow Eq. (2), but, another firm j may invest first, so i loses any further opportunity to invest
25
.  
Firm i conjectures that firm j invests when ( )x t  first crosses 
j
x  and that 
j
x  is an independent draw 
from a distribution ( )
j j
F x , with ( )
j j
F x  having continuously differentiable density ' ( )
j j
F x  with 
positive support on an interval  ,L Ux x . Since firm j invests only when ( )x t  first crosses a threshold, 
i learns about j when ( )x t  hits a new high within the support ' ( )
j j
F x . When this happens, if firm j 
invests, i learns that j’s threshold level is the current ( )x t . Conversely, if  j does not invest, firm i 
learns that j’s threshold lies in a higher range of x  values than it had previous believed (i.e., in 
ˆ ,
t U
x x    where  0ˆ maxt tx x   ). Firm i’s conditional conjecture about the distribution of j’s 
threshold is: ˆ ˆ( | ) [ ( ) ( )] / [1 ( )]
j j t j j j t j t
F x x F x F x F x  
26
. The authors provide analytical results for 
complete pre-emption multi-firm equilibrium where the incomplete information is introduced by 
letting the ith firm observe its own cost, 
i
I , when it knows only that 
j
I , with j i , is an 
independent draw from a distribution ( )G k ,whose characteristics are similar to those described 
                                                                
24 The distinction between incomplete and imperfect information is somewhat semantic (see Tirole (1988), p. 174, for 
more details). Both information structures are incorporated in ROG using similar mathematical formulations.  
25 This game can also be defined as a “winner-takes all” (WTA) game. 
26 This framework has the advantage of being easily extendable to games with more than two firms.  
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above for ( )
j j
F x . The model predicts that equity returns of firms which hold RO and are subjected 
to pre-emption will contains jumps and positive skewness. 
Murto and Keppo (2002) study a n-firm complete pre-emption game
27
 where firms compete with 
rivals for the same and unique project while monitoring the project value but being uninformed of 
their rivals valuations. They characterize a Nash equilibrium under different assumptions regarding 
the information that firms have about each other’s valuation of the project: (i) firms know the value 
of each other’s projects - complete information, and (ii) firms are uninformed of each others’ 
projects valuation - incomplete information. Their results show that the assumption on the 
information each firm has on each others’ valuation for the project has an important impact on the 
equilibrium of the investment game. When firms do not know each others’ valuation for the project 
it is suggested they should assess the likelihood that a given competitor invests in the next time 
period, and, it is shown that under this assumption the investment triggers for the Nash equilibrium 
are between the perfect information equilibrium level and the optimal monopoly level.       
Décamps and Mariotti (2004) develop a duopoly model where each firm is informed of its own 
investment cost, 
i
I , but not of the cost of the rival, which is independently drawn from a common 
knowledge distribution G  with the same characteristics as the distribution ( )
j j
F x described above 
for Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003).  For a risk-neutral world with discount rate 0r  , there are 
two players 1,2i   who can invest in a project whose value is the same for both firms and is not 
affected by whom invests first. The project can be of high or low quality, with 
0
(0,1)p   denoting 
the prior probability that the project can be of low or high quality, and firms can learn about the 
quality of the project at no cost by observing the outcome of a public signal (surveys, investment 
reports, etc) modeled as a Poisson process B  with failure rate 0B  , if the project is of low-
quality (LQ), and zero otherwise. Investment decisions are public and once a firm (leader) has 
invested, the rival (follower) receives more information about the project than that provided by the 
public signal. It is assumed that a high-quality (HQ) project never fails and generates a profit 0d   
per unit of time, and a LQ project generates the same instantaneous profit but may fail according to 
a Poisson process with failure rate 0L  , after which the profit is zero. Failures of an installed 
project are independent from that generated by the public information signal and are perfectly 
observed by the follower. With this information structure, a HQ project generates discounted profits 
/h d r  and a LQ project generates expected discount profits / ( )Ll d r   . They show that there 
                                                                
27 A WTA game where when one of the firms invests the opportunity is eliminated for the other firms.  
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is a unique (attrition game) symmetric equilibrium, which depends on the initial beliefs, and provide 
results for the impact of changes in the (asymmetric) cost and signal distributions on the optimal 
investment timing.  
Hsu and Lambrecht (2007)
 
examine the investment behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant 
that compete for a patent. The incumbent is active producing one product protected infinitely by a 
patent. The challenger can enter the market by patenting a substitute for the incumbent’s present 
product. The costs of acquiring the new patent are 
i
I  for the incumbent and 
e
I  for the entrant 
(possibly asymmetric). The challenger has complete information about the incumbent whereas the 
incumbent does not know the precise value of its opponent’s investment cost. If the patent is 
acquired by the challenger the market structure will be a duopoly with two products, otherwise 
remains as monopoly with only one product. Before the second product is launched the incumbent 
makes a profit of 
1i t
x  per unit of time, with x  following a gBm process. If it succeeds to acquire 
the new patent makes a profit of 
2i t
x . If the new entrant acquires the new patent the incumbent’s 
profits are 
i t
x , and the entrant will accumulate profits at the rate 
e t
x , where 
2 1
,  ,  
i i i
    are profits 
parameters obeying the following relations, 
2 1i i i
    . It is shown that the slightest possibility of 
pre-emption makes the informationally disadvantaged firm act at the pre-emption threshold.  
Following Hsu and Lambrecht (2007), Graham (2011) develops a duopoly ROG model with 
asymmetric information concerning the revenue. In contrast with existing models, he shows that an 
equilibrium may not exist within the standard continuous framework if the private information is 
over the revenue. Leung and Kwok (2012) study a (two-stage) preemptive patent investment game 
where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute 
product in a market with uncertain profits. The entrant has complete information on the 
commercialization cost of the incumbent and the incumbent only knows the commercialization cost 
distribution of the entrant. Their results show that the incumbent tends to act aggressively in 
response to its informationally disadvantaged status, and always suffers from a loss in its RO value 
while the RO value of the advantaged entrant may be undetermined or enhanced.   
Watanabe (2010) studies a duopoly market where profit flows have two uncertain parameters, one 
known only by the incumbent and the other shared by both firms. The incumbent has a higher 
expected profit and, therefore, invests earlier than the potential entrant. Watanabe characterizes the 
equilibrium conditions for the incumbent. Anderson et al. (2010) study a n-firm, complete pre-
emption game where firms have symmetric and complete information about the value of the 
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investment opportunity V , whose evolution follows a gBm process, and each firm has private 
information about its rivals’ (possible asymmetric) costs. Grenadier (2000a) provides several 
examples of different ROG and game information structures, and illustrations of their practical 
application. 
3.2.4 Cooperation between firms 
Most ROG models are developed for markets where cooperation is not allowed. However, often it 
is in the best interest of rivals to join forces and cooperate to share risks, restricting production or 
increasing prices. If cooperation is allowed the investment threshold points are chosen to maximize 
the sum of the firms’ value functions. When cooperation is not allowed the investment thresholds 
points are chosen to maximize the value function of each firm, leading to PE, or WOA, or WTA 
games, where the reward from the investment is asymmetrically shared by the market rivals. Some 
R&D projects, or patents, new technology, or where there are networks or standardization 
externalities are natural areas where the cooperation strategy is followed. There are very few ROG 
models considering cooperation (see the Appendix).      
Weeds (2002) uses a standard RO framework to derive the investment thresholds for a duopoly 
R&D market where firms are allowed to plan their investments cooperatively. She derives the 
function of the combined value of the two firms for sequential (leader-follower) investments and 
provides the investment thresholds for both the cooperative and the non-cooperative scenarios. Her 
results show that the investment for the non-cooperative scenarios is more delayed than for the 
cooperative scenario. Boyer et al. (2010) studies capacity-building investments focusing on a risk-
neutral homogeneous (growing) duopoly product market with incremental indivisible capacity 
investments. Firms face an inverse demand function 1( , ) ( )
t t t
P t X Y D X , where 0
t
X   is the 
aggregate output, 0
t
Y   is an industry (gBm) random shock, and :D    is a mapping 
describing the non-stochastic component of the market demand curve which is strictly decreasing, 
continuously differentiable and integrable on 

. The mapping 1( )x xD x  is strictly concave on 
[0, (0)]D  and collusion is allowed for when firms are active. Among other relevant results they 
report that “Markov Perfect Equilibrium-tacit collusion” episodes may occur only at stages where 
both firms hold positive capacity (taking the form of postponed simultaneous investments) and are 
more likely to exist in highly volatile and/or faster growing markets and low cost of capital 
scenarios.  
The models above are standard “one-shot” (investment cost) ROG. Weyant and Yao (2005) derive, 
however, a model for a duopoly market where firms make R&D investments on an ongoing 
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(continuous) basis before the success of the project is known. They argue that this ongoing nature 
and the consequent repeated strategic interactions between firms may facilitate self-enforcement 
tacit collusion. Their results show that when the information time lag is sufficiently short, 
cooperative equilibrium emerges and the investment is delayed more than for the one-firm case. 
Garlappi (2004) provides a tractable discrete-time asset pricing model that takes into account the 
different sources of uncertainty embedded in the R&D process and quantifies the effect of pre-
emption on security prices and returns. He shows that the risk premia demanded by an ownership 
claim to competing R&D ventures increase when a rival pulls ahead in the race and are lower when 
rivals are closer to each other in the development process.  Compared to the cooperative scenario, 
competition reduces the industry value and lowers the expected completion time for the project.  
Thijssen (2004, ch. 6) studies the effect of spillovers in strategic cooperative situations. Although 
not formalized in a RO framework, his approach might facilitate considering the spillover effect on 
ROG. Li and Sick (2010) examine empirically the equilibrium of firms investment behavior for a 
market where output price and production volume are uncertain, there are economies of scale and 
cooperation is allowed (network effect). They show that the probability of cooperation is positively 
affected by the network effect and negatively affected by the real option exercise price. 
3.2.5 Market sharing 
Most ROG follow the Smets (1993) pre-emption game where the market shares of the leader-
follower are assumed to remain symmetric and static after the follower entry. However, firms often 
compete in rather different economic environments where (i) due to immediately patent or 
eventually brand dominance WTA, or (ii) there is a WOA so eventually one of the firms shrinks or 
disappears, or (iii) dominate shares are allocated dynamically over time among firms, or (iv) there 
are repeated cooperative games, where market shares are maintained through collusion. Few authors 
have considered dynamic market shares. 
Grenadier (1996), Garlappi (2004), Murto and Keppo (2002), Weeds (2002) and Lambrecht and 
Perraudin (2003) study WTA games using a RO framework. Anderson et al. (2010) study complete 
pre-emption investment games based on auction and real options theory. Boyer et al. (2001) and 
Décamps and Mariotti (2004) study WOA real options games. These models characterize  either 
WTA or WOA games where ex-post market shares are assumed to be static, i.e., after the last firm 
enters, firms will share a static (and possibly symmetric) proportion of the total market. For 
instance, the Bouis et al. (2009) 3-firm model assumes that the leader gets 100% of the market share 
if active alone, 50% of the market share if active with the (first) follower, and a constant and static 
one third of the market share as soon as the second follower invests. The Pereira and Rodrigues 
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(2010) 3-firm model considers dynamic market share but in a pre-stage of the game only, where the 
entry of the third firm causes a market expansion with (possible) negative consequences on the 
market share of the rivals. Paxson and Pinto (2003) assume the market share evolves through the 
birth/death of customers, separately for the leader and the follower.  Paxson and Melmane (2009) 
assume that the market share for search engines evolves deterministically, but is subject to synergy 
shocks from complementary activities.  
3.2.6 Other innovative Parameters 
There are several other models not included in the review above that, although some are SROG in 
terms of their underlying game-theoretic aspects, consider other interesting and innovative RO 
problems where (i) there are several factors determining the value underlying the option, or (ii) 
there are multiple-options, or (iii) uncertainty is firm-specific, or the stochastic processes exhibit 
positive/negative jumps, or firm profitabilities are correlated, or (iv) there are games between 
lenders and borrowers in restructuring debt. 
(i) Most ROG models consider two-firms in a single factor single option game context, where the 
investment value uncertainty depends on a single (gBm) variable. However, often the value of 
investment projects is simultaneously affected by the (possibly random) evolution of many 
factors such as output price and quantity, investment cost, operating cost, or technical and 
technological uncertainty, and, ex-ante, firms may hold more than one option. Paxson and Pinto 
(2005) consider a duopoly where the evolution of price and quantity follow independent (but 
possible correlated) processes.  Huisman and Kort (2004) develop models for the optimization 
of new technology adoptions for duopolies where at the beginning of the game there is one 
technology available but the possibility of other technologies arriving in the near future. 
Huisman and Kort (2003) consider a duopoly where multiple technologies become available 
and the two firms have to optimize not only when to invest but also in which technology they 
should invest.  Azevedo and Paxson (2011) study a duopoly where firms have two technologies 
available whose functions are complementary and, at the beginning of the game, each firm has 
the option to adopt one or both technologies, at the same time or at different times, in a context 
where both the evolution of the market revenues and the cost of the technologies evolve 
randomly. Mason and Weeds (2010) develop a model for a duopoly market where there is (a 
perhaps persistent) first-mover advantage and the return to investment depends on the number 
and sequence of investors, showing that both sequential and simultaneous investment 
behaviours are possible in equilibrium. 
(ii) Nielson (2002) extends the duopoly result of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for investments with 
positive externalities and considers the scenario where the monopolist has multiple investment 
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opportunities. Murto et al. (2004) develops a discrete-time game for an oligopoly market where 
demand evolves stochastically and firms hold multiple investment opportunities to adjust their 
production cost functions or maximize capacity. Siddiqui and Takashima (2012) develop a 
sequential leader-follower two-stage ROG model for capacity expansion investments where 
there is knowledge spillover.  
(iii) Thijssen (2010) studies a duopoly ROG where payoffs are driven by firm-specific (and possibly 
correlated) stochastic state variables. Thijssen (2012) examines pre-emption ROG where 
payoffs are strongly Markovian, providing results for contexts where payoffs are stochastic with 
positive jumps and a theorem that gives sufficient conditions that guarantee that the solution to 
an optimal stopping problem is of the trigger variety.  Shackleton et al. (2004) study duopoly 
entry decisions where rivals earn different but correlated uncertain profitabilities from 
operating.  
(iv) Ziegler (2004) uses game theory to study leverage and bankruptcy, following Leland (1994). 
There are several extensions of his approach, including foreclosures and debt renegotiation 
strategies. Sundaresan and Wang (2007) develop a framework to model the role of financial 
architecture on ex-ante growth option exercising decisions and firm value when debt offers tax 
benefits, and show that strong equity bargaining power lowers debt capacity, reduces firm 
value, and delays the exercise of growth options. 
4. Testable Hypotheses 
There are many testable hypotheses arising from the SROG and NSROG literature, although limited 
empirical testing or calibration of theoretical parameters to date. We have tried to imagine how to 
find the parameter values required for some NSROG, and note in the Appendix whether the 
respective authors provide any data or suggested sources for data. Some of the most common 
applications of SROG and NSROG are:  “R&D investments” (at a firm-level, patent race strategies, 
design of incentives for individual or groups of researchers, or allocation of funds among competing 
projects, and, at a country level, setting of innovation policies, tax incentives or direct subsidies); 
investment in new technologies (timing the adoption of new technologies in contexts where there 
are one or several technologies available, with or without technical and technological uncertainty, in 
markets with first or second mover advantages); “production capacity choices” (when to 
expand/reduce capacity); and “product design” types of buildings or locational FMA.    
With the increasing sophistication of the information technologies and marketing monitoring 
techniques, frequent and public monitoring is today sometimes feasible, for instance in the cases of 
public marketing of innovations, FDA applications and patent applications. Progress on this 
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monitoring area would allow the calibration of some SROG and NSROG models and the empirical 
test of hypotheses.  
5. A Program for DROGs in the Future  
The ROG models reviewed above address modern questions regarding investment decisions, 
provide new solutions to investment problems, and contribute to a better understanding of the 
complex nature of firms investment behavior in markets where uncertainty and competition prevail. 
SROG advances real option models beyond monopolies by considering investments by rival firms, 
which alter market share, product profitability or market size. Standard determination of leadership 
by artificial assumptions and simple pre-emption has been improved in some NSROG articles 
assuming asymmetric information structures, or ex-ante asymmetric market advantages. 
The number of frameworks, techniques and theories combined with the real option theory has 
grown in the last two decades. The variety of assumptions made regarding the models underlying 
variables is now extensive, and the subsequent results vast and rich. ROG provide a credible 
investment analysis methodology which incorporates both uncertainty and competition, departing, 
therefore, from the classical investment appraisal techniques or real option models which make the 
unrealistic assumption that firms have a monopoly over  investment decisions. Despite the shortfalls 
in ROG developments, and the current weaknesses underlying the literature available, we have now 
sounder models, better grounded in management intuition and economic theory, flexible and varied 
enough to incorporate a wide array of economic contexts.  
5.1 Six Suggested Improvements 
We suggest that ROG could be significantly improved through (i) benchmarking meta-analysis 
comparisons, (ii) empirical applications where there is reasonable macro empirical data, extended to 
areas where micro empirical parameter values can be calibrated, (iii) asymmetries identified and 
measured, (iv) guidance for instantaneous investment in continuous time, (v) exploring the often 
gray area between endogeneous and exogenous leadership, and (vi) clarifying the determinants of 
the leader or follower. 
(i) We believe that a benchmarking empirical study, where the most relevant models from each 
group identified in section 3.2 are subjected to a parameter calibration and the results compared, 
would contribute significantly to future progress. Such research would be a key element to 
identifying incongruence areas, inaccuracies, unjustified disparities among models, successes 
and shortfalls within the ROG literature and, above all, define which research avenues should be 
followed and which should be abandoned. Inevitably, in this journey there are shortfalls, such as 
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the unacceptable and, perhaps, unjustified low number of empirical studies and the lack of 
benchmarking among ROG model results. Thus it is difficult to discuss, with some scientific 
basis, the value added and the progress made with the arrival of new models. 
(ii) Without empirical work and comparison among the model results, the accumulation of a high 
number of models representing (small) improvements or extensions to the literature available 
may not represent the embedded value that we might expect, and risks increasing the complexity 
of models. For managing this “complexity versus accuracy problem” we suggest a division of 
the literature into two groups: (a) ROG models for use at macro-level, usually by governments to 
design/manage public policies, such as industry investment incentives, and tax, R&D and 
subsidy policies and (b) ROG models used at micro-level in investment projects. Simplicity 
should be the role underlying the development of models for both groups, but very complex 
innovations/frameworks should be tested, preferably, in the former group first and, if feasible, 
extended then to the later. 
(iii) This review organizes ROG models into game-theoretic related categories, a unique 
contribution. For each group identified in section 3.2, there is room for improvements, 
especially the models considering market “asymmetries” between firms and “asymmetric”, or 
“incomplete” or “imperfect” game information. So far, with few exceptions, ROG models have 
addressed economic contexts where just one of the above NSROG assumptions holds. 
(iv)  ROG shares some of the not yet adequately addressed inconsistencies of continuous-time 
games such as “in continuous-time what does it mean to invest immediately after?” As 
highlighted by Thijssen et al. (2012) the application of the F&T (1985) deterministic timing 
game results to continuous-time frameworks needs careful consideration. We should keep 
monitoring, and incorporating in ROG models, the future developments and progresses made 
on this regard in the literature on “continuous-time games of timing”.  
(v) Another issue in need of some clarification is the so called “endogenous” versus “exogenous” 
leadership. In our research we define the leadership as “exogenous” when firms strategies are 
“pure and exogenously set” (deterministic), and “endogenous” when firms strategies are either 
randomized, leading to Bayesian Nash-equilibrium as in Anderson et al. ( 2010), or the firm 
real option exercise (leadership) depends on the exercise strategies of all the real option 
holders. In the later case, firms optimal exercise strategies cannot be derived in isolation but as 
part of a game-theoretic equilibrium.  
(vi) Some improvements may also be possible regarding whether “the roles of the leader and the 
follower” are interchangeable or predetermined. This is of particular importance to modeling, 
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and must be defined accordingly, because, if the roles are predetermined, the follower cannot 
enter the market before the leader, and the leader recognizes the value of the option to wait 
from this source. In SROG models, the leadership in the investment is exogenously set and 
simultaneous moves are sometimes not allowed. The standard procedure consists of, firstly, 
finding a decision making rule for the follower assuming that the leader has already entered the 
market, and  secondly,  considering the entry decision of the leader taking into account of the 
ex-ante determined follower’s response. This framework works well for duopolies, but, for 
investment contexts with more than two firms, and especially for perfect competition markets, 
the determination of the sequence by which firms invest is much more challenging. Solutions 
for this problem, so far, have relied on general frameworks like that of Leahy (1993), which 
have the disadvantage of determining the optimal investment behavior of all market players 
without specifying what they should do in case one, or several, players move first.  
 
In the future, new and more sophisticated ROG models are expected. The “blank spaces” in the 
Appendix  may be of some further help to guide researchers in developing improved ROG models. 
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Appendix:  Game Theory Aspects underlying the most Relevant Literature on Real Option Games. 
Note:  
#1 - we define a “one-shot” ROG as a game where firms hold a single option, as in Dixit and Pindyk (1994, ch. 9), and a “large” ROG as a game where firms hold more than one option, as in Ruiz-Aliseda (2013), or where the 
number of firms is large, as in Grenadier (1996, 2000a, 2002) and Aguerrevere (2003).  
#2 - we distinguish ROG where firms face the same market variables but are asymmetrically informed of their current value and/or future evolution (as in Decamp and Mariotti, 2004) from ROG where firms are asymmetrically 
affected by the same market variable(s) but symmetrically informed of such aspect of the game (as in Pawlina and Kort, 2006). 
#3 - “ 2n  ” means the ex-ante number of firms that are allowed to compete for the investment revenues, not the number of firms that are allowed to invest. 
 
Articles 
Formalism Game Information Type of ROG n (Firms) Industry or  
Application(s) 
(Suggested/used in  
the article) 
Discrete 
Time 
Continuous 
time 
Complete Incomplete Perfect Imperfect Symmetric Asymmetric Simultaneous Sequential One 
-shot 
Large Winner 
Takes 
All 
Zero-
sum 
Nonzero 
sum 
Time Horizon Cooperative Non 
cooperative 
Ex-ante 
Symmetric 
Ex-ante 
Asymmetric 
 1 2 2  
Finite Infinite 
Aguerrevere (2003)  x x  x  x  x x x x  x   x  x x  x x x Manufacturing 
Aguerrevere (2009)  x x  x  x  x x  x  x   x  x x    x Manufacturing 
Armada et al. (2009)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x x x x x   x Not  
Specifyed 
Anderson et al. (2010)  x  x x  x   x x x x x   x  x x x x x x Mining & Retailing  
Azevedo and Paxson (2011)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x  x x   x  New 
Technology Adoptions 
Baba (2001)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x  x  x  x  Banking 
Bouis et al. (2009)   x x   x   x   x x x    x     x   x x     x Not  
Specifyed 
Boyer et al. (2012)  x   x  x   x x   x   x x x x   x  Manufacturing 
Carlson et al. (2012)  x x  x  x   x x x  x   x  x  x  x  Manufacturing 
Chevalier-Roignant et al. (2010)  x x x x  x  x x x   x   x  x x    x Not  
Specifyed 
Cottrell and Sick (2002)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x  x x   x  Innovation Investment  
projects  
Décamps and Mariotti (2004)  x  x x  x x  x x   x   x  x    x  Not Specifyed 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)   x x   x   x     x x    x     x   x x  x x x Not specifyed 
 (Textbook) 
Garlappi (2004) x  x  x  x   x  x x x   x x x x   x  Patent Races  
R&D ventures 
Goto et al. (2008)  x x  x  x   x  x  x   x  x x   x  Manufacturing 
Graham (2011)  x  x  x  x  x x   x   x  x  x  x  Not  
Specifyed 
Grenadier (1996)   x x   x   x    x x x    x     x   x x   x   Real Estate  
Grenadier (1999)  x x x  x  x x x x x  x   x  x  x  x x Real Estate Oil well drilling 
Pharmaceutical 
Grenadier (2000a)  x x x x x x x x x x x  x   x  x x x  x x Not  
Specifyed (Textbook) 
Grenadier (2000b)  x x  x  x   x    x   x  x x   x  Real Estate Oil well drilling 
Pharmaceutical 
Grenadier (2002)   x x   x   x   x x x x   x     x   x x     x Real Estate 
Huisman (2001)   x x   x   x   x x x    x     x   x x 
ch. 7, 9 
x 
ch. 8 
 x   New Technology Adoptions 
(Textbook) 
Huisman and Kort (2004)   x x   x   x     x x    x     x   x x   x   New 
Technology Adoptions 
Hsu and Lambrecht (2007)  x  x  x  x  x x   x   x  x  x  x  Patent Race 
Kong and Kwok (2007)  x x  x  x  x x x   x   x  x  x  x  Not Specifyed 
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Appendix, cont. 
Articles 
Formalism Game Information Type of ROG n (Firms) Industry or  
Application(s) 
Discrete 
time 
Continuous 
Time 
Complete Incomplete Perfect Imperfect Symmetric Asymmetric Simultaneous Sequential One 
-shot 
Large Winner 
Takes 
All 
Zero-
sum 
Nonzero 
sum 
Time Horizon Cooperative Non 
cooperative 
Ex-ante 
Symmetric 
Ex-ante 
Asymmetric 
 1 2 2  
(Suggested/used in  
the article) 
Finite Infinite 
Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) x  x  x  x  x x x   x   x  x x x x x  Standard Investment Projects 
Lambrecht (1999)  x x  x x x x  x x   x   x  x x x  x x Patent Race 
(published in a textbook) 
Lambrecht (2001)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x  x x  x x x Banking 
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)   x   x x   x  x   x x   x x     x   x x   x x Retailing 
Leung and Kwok (2012)  x  x  x  x  x x   x   x  x  x  x  Patent Race 
Mason and Weeds (2010)  x x  x  x  x x x   x   x  x x   x  Not  
Specifyed 
Murto and Keppo (2002)   x x x x   x x  x   x   x      x   x x x x x  x Tele 
communication 
Murto (2004)   x x   x   x   x x x     x    x   x x x  x   Not  
Specifyed 
Murto et al. (2004) x  x  x  x x x  x   x   
 
x  x x    x Non-storable  
Commodity 
Nielson (2002)  x x  x  x  x x x   x   x  x    x x Software  
hardware 
Odening et al. (2007)  x x  x  x  x  x x   x   x  x x    x Agriculture 
Pawlina and Kort (2006)   x x   x   x  x x x    x     x   x  x  x   Not  
Specifyed 
Paxson and Pinto (2005)   x x   x   x    x x x    x     x   x x   x   Not  
Specifyed 
Paxson and Melmane (2009)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x  x x   x  Internet 
Pereira and Rodrigues (2010)  x x  x  x   x x    x  x  x x    x Not  
Specifyed 
Reiss (1998)   x x   x     x x x x    x     x   x  x x  x x Patent Race 
Ruiz-Aliseda (2013)  x x  x  x   x  x  x   x  x  x  x  Not  
Specifyed 
Siddiqui and Takashima (2012)  x x  x  x   x  x   x  x  x x  x x  R&D  
Investment 
Shackleton et al. (2004)   x x   x   x     x x    x     x   x x x  x   Aircraft Industry 
Smets (1993)  x x  x  x   x x   x   x x x x   x  Not  
Specifyed 
Smit and Ankum (1993) x   x   x   x   x x x   x     x   x x   x   R&D  
Investment 
Smit (2003) x   x   x   x   x x x   x     x   x x   x   Public Infrastructure 
R&D 
Smit  and Trigeorgis (2004) x 
ch. 4, 5, 
6, 7 
x x x 
ch. 9 
x x 
ch. 7, 9 
x x 
ch. 7, 9  
 x x  x 
ch. 8 
x   x x 
ch. 8 
x x  x x  Electronics R&D, Oil  
(Textbook) 
Sparla (2004)  x x  x  x  x x x   x   x  x x x  x  Manufacturing 
Thijssen et al. (2010)   x x   x   x   x x x   x     x   x x x  x   Not  
Specifyed 
Tsekrekos (2003)   x x   x   x    x x x    x     x   x x   x   Not  
Specifyed 
Watanabe (2010)  x  x x   x  x x   x   x  x  x  x  Not  
Specifyed 
Weeds (2002)   x x   x   x     x x  x      x x x x   x   Patent Race 
Weyant and Yao (2005)  x x  x  x  x x  x  x   x  x x   x  R&D 
Williams (1993)   x x   x   x   x  x   x     x   x x  x x  x Real Estate 
Wu (2006)  x x  x  x  x x  x  x   x  x x   x  Manufacturing 
 
